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DEVELOPMENT INC.; MARK S. SANDBERG; 
L. WAYNE REDD; LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a general partnership 
aka REDD HALE INVESTMENT GROUP; and 
HALE/REDD LAND INVESTMENT, a joint venture, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS COUNTY, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY, et al., 
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v. 
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP., et al., 
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LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.; LANDFORMS 
DEVELOPMENT INC.; MARK S. SANDBERG; 
L. WAYNE REDD; LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a general partnership 
aka REDD HALE INVESTMENT GROUP; and 
HALE/REDD LAND INVESTMENT, a joint venture, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS COUNTY, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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Bountiful City Attorney 
P.O. Box 331 
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PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs are William and Judy McCleery, Mark and 
Teresia Pantelakis, Dennis and Gloria Anderson, James and Linda 
Stover, David C. Fricke, Barrie D. and Katherine Brewer, Ronald 
and Kerma Jones, Richard and Barbara Kristensen, Lyle and Alice 
Laraine Gordon, and S. Michael and Sandra J. Inman. Plaintiffs 
are Davis County homeowners who claim to have sustained property 
damage. Plaintiffs are not parties to this appeal. 
2. Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs are Landforms 
Construction Corp., Landforms Developments Inc., Mark S. 
Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd Investment 
Group, a general partnership, aka Redd Hale Investment Group and 
Hale/Redd Land Investment, a joint venture. These parties are 
landowners and developers of property known as Bridlewood located 
near homeowners' property in Bountiful City. (The partnership or 
joint venture formed by Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd and Lyle 
A. Hale has been referred to by different titles; therefore, it 
is referred to in different ways in the pleadings.) 
3. Defendants who are not Third-Party Plaintiffs are 
Verl G. Smart, an owner of property located near homeowners' 
property in Davis County and the Consortium, Inc., an engineering 
company which did engineering work on Bridlewood. These 
Defendants are not parties to the appeal. 
4. Third-Party Defendants are Bountiful City and Davis 
County. 
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JURISDICTION OP THE COURT 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to consider 
and hear this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of 
Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah, Rule 3 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(1988), and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Second Judicial District court entered Final Summary Judgment in 
favor of the Third-Party Defendants, Bountiful City and Davis 
County on October 11, 1988, and certified the Judgment for 
appeal. A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 25, 1988. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. (1986) grants 
Respondent Davis County Immunity from suit by Appellants. 
2. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is consistent 
with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22. 
2. Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 63-30-3 and 63-30-10.5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case began as a property damage action brought by 
the Plaintiffs (hereinafter "homeowners") against several 
Defendants, including the owners and developers of land known as 
the Bridlewood Development. The homeowners7 complaint, in 
substance, sought to recover compensation for property damage 
resulting from floods which occurred in 1986. Third-Party 
1 
Plaintiffs brought an action against Bountiful City and Davis 
County for contribution, indemnity, and a comparison of fault by 
way of a Third-Party Complaint. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs seek review of the Order of the 
Second Judicial District Court granting summary judgment to 
Third-Party Defendants (Bountiful City and Davis County) which 
was entered on October 11, 1988. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Appellants have set forth in their brief a lengthy 
Statement of Facts which they contend support their claim that 
the decision of the lower Court should be overruled. However, 
Appellants7 Statement of Facts ignores some important facts, and 
in several instances, misstates the facts. The facts set forth 
hereafter will either focus on those ignored by Appellants or 
misstated by Appellants: 
1. The property owned or controlled by Appellants was 
annexed into Bountiful City August 29, 1984. (Annexation Plat, 
Exhibit 58) 
2. Property along Monarch Drive, immediately below the 
property annexed into Bountiful City, remained in the 
unincorporated area of Davis County. (Annexation Plat, Exhibit 
58) 
3. The developers were required to obtain subdivision 
approval for their plans from the Bountiful City Planning and 
Zoning Commission, the Bountiful City Council, and the Bountiful 
City Engineer prior to beginning actual construction of the 
project. (R.488) 
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4. As a condition to the approval of the Bridlewood 
Subdivision of Appellants, the Bountiful City Planning Commission 
required the Appellants to construct a detention basin on 
property of the developer or participate in the construction of a 
regional detention basin with Davis County by funding a portion 
of the cost of the regional detention basin. (Sandberg Depo. 
p.56) 
5. Appellants, applied to and obtained from Bountiful 
City on November 27, 1985, a bond agreement for completion of 
subdivision improvements. (Exhibit 103) 
6. Appellants discussed the location, the approximate 
size and detail of the outflow of the temporary detention basin 
with Bountiful City officials. (Sandberg depo. p.154) 
7. Bountiful City Inspectors and City Engineer were 
concerned about the measures the developer was taking to prevent 
temporary storm runoff and Bountiful City Engineers gave their 
professional opinions and directions. (Sandberg depo. p.157) 
8. Appellants were concerned that they did what 
Bountiful required them to do regarding temporary storm 
retention. (Sandberg depo. p.159) 
9. Bountiful City directed the detention basin to be 
dredged on several occasions. (Sandberg depo. p.163) 
10. Bountiful City gave the recommendation for the size 
of the outflow line of the temporary retention basin. (Sandberg 
depo. p.168) 
11. Heavy "100 year storms" occurred on July 23 and 
August 20, 1986, which, combined with conditions then existing on 
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the Bridlewood Subdivision caused the Plaintiffs to sustain the 
damages for which they seek recovery in this lawsuit. (R.40) 
12. After the July 23, 1986, storm, Bountiful City 
recommended to Appellants that the temporary retention basin be 
increased in its size. (Sandberg depo. p.171) 
13. Mark Sandberg, one of the Appellants, talked with 
Davis County in general terms about what was being done with the 
Bridlewood project, but specific approval on all phases of the 
Bridlewood Subdivision came from Bountiful City. (Sandberg depo. 
p.173) 
14. Mark Sandberg, one of the Appellants, did not feel 
he needed any approval from the Respondent Davis County to 
proceed with the temporary detention basin or in any of the 
Bridlewood Subdivision because Davis County had no authority to 
prevent development of the retention basin or the Bridlewood 
Subdivision. Information communicated to Davis County was as a 
courtesy only. (Sandberg depo. p.175) 
15. When development of Bridlewood Subdivision actually 
started, the developers were required by Bountiful City and not 
Davis County to construct the access road in its entirety, rather 
than in phases. (Balling depo. p.85 and Balling depo. p.128-129) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent Davis County urges this Court to uphold the 
decision of the trial Court which granted Respondent Davis 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respondent Davis County first argues that the factual 
basis relied upon for support of much of Appellants7 position is 
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simply incorrect. The facts are clear and undisputed that 
Respondent Davis County did not require the construction of the 
road in Appellants' subdivision. Appellants assert that the 
decision to construct the road in their subdivision should not be 
shielded by governmental immunity. Since Respondent Davis County 
had no authority to make any decision on the roadway and in fact 
made no decision on the roadway requirement, Appellants' 
arguments related thereto simply do not apply to Respondent Davis 
County. 
Respondent Davis County next argues that management of 
the flood waters or construction of the flood and storm water 
systems are defined by statutes as being governmental functions. 
Any damage Appellants may have suffered which can be apportioned 
to Respondent Davis County resulted either from Respondent Davis 
County's failure to manage flood waters or its failure to 
construct flood and storm water systems. Governmental immunity 
applies not only to the exercise of a governmental function, but 
also to a failure or omission to exercise a governmental 
function. Respondent Davis County is, therefore, immune from 
suit. 
Finally, Respondent Davis County argues that when all of 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Statute are 
considered together, they are not in conflict with an express 
constitutional provision. To rule in favor of Appellants and 
strike down Section 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated (1986) would be 
premature since the lower Court has made no ruling on what, if 
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any, property rights of Appellants may have been taken or damaged 
for public use by Respondent Davis County. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
SECTION 63-30-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1986) GRANTS 
RESPONDENT DAVIS COUNTY IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BY 
APPELLANTS. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3 
(1986), states in pertinent part the following: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
For purposes of analysis, Appellants in their Brief 
divide Respondent Davis County's activities into two distinct 
areas. First, Respondent Davis County imposed a requirement that 
an access road be constructed in a single phase, rather than in 
the three phases Appellants desired. Second, Respondent Davis 
County delayed getting its regional detention basin constructed 
in a timely way, thereby foreclosing Appellants7 option to 
construct their own on site detention facility. 
Appellants' first statement is simply not supported by 
the undisputed facts. There can be no question that the 
subdivision development of Appellants was located within 
Bountiful City, so that Respondent Davis County had no authority 
to approve or disapprove any planning decisions made by Bountiful 
City. In addition, numerous times in Appellants7 Brief 
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Appellants state that Bountiful City and Davis County required 
the construction of the access road. It is Appellants7 
contention that the construction of the access road in a single 
phase was a contributing cause of the damage Plaintiffs suffered. 
There can be no question that Davis County, in fact, did not 
require any access road be constructed in a single phase or in 
multiple phases. The authority to make the decision and the 
decision to require the road to be constructed in a single phase 
was that of Bountiful City, and not Davis County. Consequently, 
any argument Appellants make as to damages sustained by virtue of 
the road requirement has no application to Respondent Davis 
County. 
The second point Appellants focus upon can be summarized 
simply. It is that Respondent Davis County delayed in building a 
regional detention basin. As a result of Respondent Davis 
County's failure to build the regional detention basis timely, 
the August 20, 1986, storm was not managed by Respondent Davis 
County and Plaintiffs were damaged thereby. 
Appellants urge this Court to "focus on the cause of the 
problem...and not the result of the problem." As it relates to 
Respondent Davis County, the cause of the problem was Davis 
County's failure to manage flood waters or its failure to 
construct a flood and storm system to contain the "100 year 
rainstorm" which occurred on August 20, 1986. Appellants 
contention is that if Davis County had managed the flood waters 
through the retention basin which it failed to build, no damage 
or very little damage would have been suffered by Plaintiffs. 
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Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. (1986), declares that 
the management of flood waters and other natural disasters and 
the construction of storm systems by governmental entities are 
governmental functions and governmental entities, which includes 
Davis County, are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from the management of flood waters or the construction 
of a flood and storm system. 
For purposes of this Brief, there is no question that 
Davis County did not manage flood waters or construct a flood and 
storm water system to prevent damage to Plaintiffs. This Court, 
however, has ruled that governmental immunity applies not only to 
the exercise of a governmental function, but also to a failure or 
omission to exercise a governmental function. In Madsen v. 
Brothick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), depositors in Grove Finance 
Company brought an action against the Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah seeking 
reimbursement for their lost deposits. The Plaintiffs alleged 
that because the Commissioner of Financial Institutions failed to 
perform his responsibilities, the depositors lost their money in 
an insolvent Grove Finance Company. This Court, through Justice 
Oaks said, 
Finally, we see no merit in Plaintiffs7 
argument that Section 63-30-3's conferral of 
immunity from suit for injuries which result 
"from the exercise of a governmental function" 
(emphasis added) withholds immunity for 
injuries resulting from a failure or omission 
to act. Whether an act is deemed to be an act 
of commission or omission often depends on how 
the occurrence is described. An important 
legal consequence should not be at the mercy 
of semantics. We are unwilling to read this 
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artificial distinction into the Governmental 
Immunity Act in the absence of a clearly 
expressed legislative purpose to that effect. 
We find none. In fact, the use of the words 
"act or omission" elsewhere in the statue, 
e.g., Section 63-30-4 and Section 63-30-10, 
provides clear indication that no such 
distinction was intended. 
at page 631. 
In Brothick, this Court struggled with the question of 
whether the activities of the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions were activities that could only be performed by a 
governmental agency. In this case, the legislature has 
specifically declared that management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities are, "considered to be governmental 
functions." By statutory definition, therefore, the management 
of flood waters or construction of flood and storm systems is a 
governmental function. The grant of immunity includes the 
exercise of a governmental function as well as the failure or 
omission to exercise a governmental function. Respondent Davis 
County urges this Court to uphold the Summary Judgment granted by 
the District Court. 
Point II 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS 
CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution 
states, 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation. 
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Consistent with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, is Section 63-30-10.5, Utah Code Ann. (1986) which 
provides the following: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when 
the governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be 
assessed according to the requirements of 
Chapter 34, Title 78. 
If Respondent Davis County has taken or damaged private 
property of Appellants for public use, Appellants are entitled to 
bring an action against Respondent Davis County pursuant to 
Chapter 34, Title 78. No such action has been filed. No 
determination has been made by the lower court of whether 
Respondent has taken or damaged private property of Appellants. 
Hence, there is no action from which an appeal can be taken. At 
this juncture, Appellants' property rights, if any, are 
contingent at best. Appellants are essentially asking this Court 
to render an advisory opinion on a matter which is not presently 
ripe for determination by the Court. 
If this Court were to declare Section 63-30-3 
unconstitutional based upon the present facts of this case, this 
Court would set a dangerous precedent and greatly expand the 
definition of what constitutes private property for which 
compensation must be paid. Likewise, the definition of what 
constitutes a taking or damaging of private property and the 
definition of what constitutes a public use would be 
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significantly expanded. Such a precedent would be set when there 
were no facts before the lower Court, nor are there any before 
this Court to identify what property of Appellants has been 
damaged or taken. In addition, the record is devoid of any facts 
which show what public use the property of Appellants has been 
put to. 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. (1986), is not squarely 
in conflict with an express constitutional provision when read in 
concert with other provisions of Chapter 30 of Title 63, and, 
therefore, should not be declared unconstitutional. In addition, 
Appellants' claim is premature and is not ripe for judicial 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Davis County urges this Court to uphold the 
Summary Judgment granted by the trial Court for the reasons that 
Respondent Davis County is immune from suit for its failure to 
manage flood or storm waters or its failure to construct storm 
and flood water systems. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of 
L^fcZcsA , 1989. 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Gerald E. H e s s C ^ 
Chief Civil Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
^ I hereby certify that on this " ^ day of 
7 y ^l/i^ , 1989, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
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